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Order and Peace: Samuel Seabury’s Concept of Liberty
Cho-Chien Feng

1. Introduction
The idea of liberty has been the subject of incessant debate. People around the world define
the concept of liberty in different ways. For example, supporters of gay rights claim that liberty
gives homosexuals the right to marry, yet at the same time, conservatively-inclined people in the
United States argue that their liberty is threatened when President Obama executes his plans for
the health care system. People have argued about the meaning of liberty throughout the centuries.
Although the focus of the debates seemed to be diverse, the spirit underlying the debates was
always the same: expanding the realm of human liberty for outside groups. The history of early
modern American freedom, Michal Jan Rozbicki concluded in his book, was “a lengthy
chronicle of diverse groups pounding at the gates and demanding membership.”1 As historians
continue to explore how different groups of people have claimed liberty for themselves, it
becomes clear that liberty is not a self-evident right, but is instead a locus of conflict and
contestation.
In the eighteenth century, people in the Atlantic world also contested the meanings and
boundaries of the concept of liberty. This thesis utilizes New York Anglican priest Samuel
Seabury’s writings to elucidate the how Loyalists conceived the notion of liberty. The Loyalist
conception of liberty is important for understanding how moderates and conservatives viewed
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liberty during the revolutionary era. Despite the significance of Loyalists’ conception of liberty
to the understanding of the political thought of the revolutionary era, this avenue of study has
been overshadowed by the Patriots’ victory and the subsequent growth of the United States.
Several anecdotes and case studies will illuminate the importance of alternative concepts of
liberty.
I would like to begin with a story of a moderate Loyalist, William Smith (1728–1793), to
explain the crucial role that Loyalists played in the American Revolution’s intellectual history.
On July 6, 1776, William Smith, a lawyer in New York, received a summons from the
Committee of the Congress of New York. The committee condemned New Yorkers who refused
to “associate with their fellow citizens for the defence of their common rights” and “never
manifested by their conduct, a zeal for, and an attachment to the American cause,” or had
“maintained an equivocal neutrality.” They “have been considered by their countrymen in a
suspicious light.” Therefore, “for the satisfaction of the people, who, in times so dangerous and
critical, are naturally led to consider those as their enemies,” the committee asked him to declare
himself to be a friend to the American cause. 2 Although the revolutionaries outnumbered
Loyalists and neutrals, did they therefore have the right to deprive the Loyalists’ right to pursue
the liberty that they sought? When the revolutionaries forced others to agree with the “common
rights” or common interests they defined, were they consistent with their claims of inherent
rights? I suggest that the answer is no. I therefore believe that we should also consider the
American Revolution from the Loyalist perspective.
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Most Americans regarded themselves as subjects of the British King before the Revolution.
Brendan McConville asserted that the cultural milieu of royal America before 1776 was
monarchical and imperial.3 A transformational period before the American Revolution, however,
turned many people from loyalty to Britain and instead pointed people towards a stance of
complete separation from the Mother Country. Patriots utilized the idea of liberty to promote the
separation. People of different positions argued about the origins of the right of liberty, and their
different assertions later created a discrepancy between Patriots and Loyalists. Hence,
reexamining the Loyalists’ idea of liberty by discerning what they regarded as their liberty is
crucial for us to reconstruct the true image of the intellectual world during the revolutionary
crisis.
Basically, many Loyalists supported colonial opposition against the Stamp Act and
Townshend Duties. Many scholars have already attempted to explain how economic and political
interests drove many latent Loyalists to support the Stamp Act Congress initially, but eventually
turned towards full-fledged Loyalism.4 However, in addition to personal economic interests and
a desire for political patronage, Loyalists also had intellectual reasons for not following the
revolutionaries. They also cherished their liberty, but their idea of liberty was different from the
liberty that the revolutionaries pursued. Unfortunately, this incongruity eventually compelled
thousands of people to lose their properties, families, friends, and reputations. When the Patriots
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deported or imprisoned the Loyalists, we can see that, like slaves, the Loyalists were another
group of people who were not applicable to the phrase “all men are created equal.”5
The composition of the New York Loyalists was complex. Each person had different reasons
to stay loyal to the British king. This thesis focuses on the idea of an Anglican cleric, Samuel
Seabury, and argues that Seabury’s arguments about liberty centered on several topics: the
justification of the representatives; the supreme national authority; and the conditions of liberty.
Whereas Patriots attempted to enlarge the realm of people who possessed liberty and had the
right to participate in politics, Seabury adopted a more conservative stance on the distribution of
the right of liberty. Seabury was satisfied with the liberty under the British Constitution, and
tended to maintain the status quo. The Patriots protected their liberty by rebelling, and the
Loyalists claimed their ideal liberty by uniting with the British side.

2. Previous studies on the New York Loyalists in the American Revolution: intellectual and
factional perspectives
2.1 American Revolution
Since the American Revolution marked the commencement of the United States, historians of
every generation have attempted to interpret its founding period. Progressive historians tended to
elucidate the founding period from the perspective of party politics and economic interests.6

5

Continental Congress, Declaration of Independence (Philadelphia, 1776)
For more on the party-politics interpretation, see Carl Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of
New York, 1760-1776 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960). For the preeminent economic interpretation
of the American Revolution, see Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States
(New York: Free Press, 1913).
6

4

They viewed ideas merely as “projected rationalizations of underlying interests.” 7 Dissatisfied
with the economic interpretation of Progressive historians, the next generation of historians
“located the Revolution within a homogeneous past.” 8 Richard Hofstadter stated that a new
interpretation of America's political tradition was required in light of the existence of “a common
climate of opinion,” one “obscured by the tendency to place political conflict in the foreground
of history.”9 Because of their emphasis on the existence of “a common climate of opinion,” they
were called consensus historians. This interpretation also claimed that the Founders' political
thought was rooted in the Lockean variation of the principles of classical liberalism. According
to Alan Gibson, after World War II, this Lockean interpretation of the American Founding
“became a centerpiece of the consensus historians’ efforts to displace the Progressives’ conflict
model of American history.” While the Progressive historians explained American history as a
series of conflicts between agrarian debtors and commercial capitalists, consensus historians
emphasized “the continuity throughout American history of the middle-class structure of
American society and the hegemony of liberal values such as the sanctity of property, economic
individualism, and democracy.”10
To revise the liberal interpretation, a group of scholars—who were later called the republican
school— turned to emphasize the importance of non-Lockean ideas. They rejected the existence
of a Lockean consensus in the age of the American Revolution, and argued that republican
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values spread everywhere in the culture of the western world; therefore, republican ideas played
a crucial role in the Revolution.11 The first historian to lead this trend was Bernard Bailyn.
In 1960s, Bernard Bailyn planned to publish a complete series of American Revolutionary
pamphlets. Eventually, he only finished the first volume; however, he later expanded the
introduction of this volume into a classic work, The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution. Bailyn argued that there were many different sources of revolutionary ideology. He
traced some of the origins of revolutionary ideology back to the classics. He regarded the main
contribution of the classical world was not in logic or theory, but merely in terminology. For
example, the Patriots used terms such as virtue and corruption, but not in their original meanings
in classic age. The works of rationalism in the Enlightenment directly shaped the idea of the
revolutionary generation. They “expressed not simply the rationalism of liberal reform but that of
enlightened conservatism as well.” 12 The tradition of English common law and Protestant
political and social theory were also important sources for the pamphlets. In addition, the British
dissenting tradition was gradually incorporated into colonial society from the seventeenth
century onwards. The Revolutionary pamphlets were also filled with the dissenting tradition’s
suspicion of monarchic despotism. The changes in the American colonies’ political and
economic system made the description of the English dissenters, especially the accusations of the
commonwealth men against Robert Walpole, looked like depictions of their own real lives in
America.13 This radical tradition, Bailyn believed, provided a force to harmonize the “discordant
elements in the political and social thought.” This force brought together Enlightenment
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abstractions, common law precedents, covenant theology, and classical analogy into a
comprehensive political theory.14
Gordon Wood argued that republican values spread everywhere in the culture of the Western
world. Quoting Franco Venturi, Wood claimed that by the eighteenth century, republicanism had
become “a form of life, a set of ideals and beliefs that rooted in the culture.15 He further asserted
that the Revolution brought the republican tendencies to the surface, which abolished the
monarchical remains, and also “create[d] once and for all new, enlightened republican
relationship among people.” This change indicated a real radical revolution, not only in politics,
but also in society.16 As for the people’s attitude toward independence, Wood believed that by
embracing the language of radical Whigs and attacking the “monarchical abuse of family
influence and patronage, people were destroying the bonds of traditional monarchical society.”
Therefore, their opposition was not only political, but also social.17 By constructing not only a
new form of government, but also a new concept of politics, Wood believed that the Revolution
led the Americans out of the classical and medieval world, and into a modern political
discussion.18
J. G. A. Pocock disagreed with Wood on the modernity of the American Revolution by
stating that he viewed the Revolution not as “the first political act of revolutionary
enlightenment,” but instead as “the last great act of the Renaissance.”19 He thought that Wood
slightly overstated his belief that the classical political theory was supplanted. Pocock suggested
14
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that “virtue” worked both in the “civic independence” of freeholders as well as the membership
in a hierarchical order. That meant that republican theory could also be described as hierarchical,
and therefore the Revolution did not bring Americans into modernity.20 In addition, he asserted
that the American Revolution, in the context of British history, provided evidence for the
existence of a republican alternative within the parliamentary tradition. The Patriots used this
republicanism to deny Parliament its authority as well as to produce a different mode of
government. He stated that “the republican, commonwealth, or country tradition . . . provided
Americans with a radical but rather shallow explanation of why they could no longer be
parliamentary Englishmen, and a rather profound understanding of what else they might
become.” 21 Bailyn, Wood, and Pocock, though not totally in agreement with one another,
established a firm foundation on the republican interpretation of the intellectual history of the
American Revolution by using pamphlets and other political writings to elucidate how the
ideology of republicanism affected the American Revolution.
More recent scholars have modified the findings of the republican school. Using the idea of
liberty as a central theme, Michal Rozbicki’s Culture and Liberty in the Age of the American
Revolution attempted to “recover the contemporary meaning of liberty,” and in the process
suggested “revising some of the ways we currently understand the founding of the nation.” 22 His
intention to “recover the contemporary meaning of liberty” sounds pretty close to that of Wood
and Pocock. However, the essence of Rozbicki’s effort is different. He said that “Political theory
and philosophical ideas–as elaborated in the classical works of authors like Bernard Bailyn and

Pocock, “Virtue and Commerce,” 133.
J. G. A. Pocock, “1776: The Revolution Against Parliament,” in Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on
Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
74–5.
22
Michal Jan Rozbicki, Culture and Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution, 1.
20
21

8

Pocock–are only some of the many bodies of knowledge that constitute such reality, and only
partially illuminate what historical events meant to historical actors.” 23 Rozbicki attempted to
bridge “the current gap between the political and cultural history of the Revolution,” and
encourages “these two fields to speak to each other more often and more creatively.” 24 What
does he mean by bridge the gap? Rozbicki reminded his readers that “Early modern liberty was a
social relation between unequals, and as such could not have existed in and of itself as an
abstract right, nor should it be examined as such.” Therefore, “any account of Revolutionary
liberty should be deeply rooted in the relationship between those who enjoyed the full privileges
of freedom and those who held only a few, or none.” 25 In other words, although the idea of
liberty has been taken for granted in our age, we should be aware that it did not possess such a
simple connotation during the age of the American Revolution. He concluded that “liberties first
had to be invented (symbolic level), and legitimized by some, before they could be claimed by
others.” He successfully argued that the invention of ideas precede the exercise of the idea in that
culture. As for the American Revolution, Rozbicki claimed that “the emergence of freedom was
not just a response to unfreedom; it was an outcome of the practices of the ruling class, because
they were already the most free, they held cultural authority, and they were able not only to
circumscribe particular liberties but also bestow worth and reputation on them.”26 Rozbicki calls
on scholars to rethink the cultural influence on the development of the concept of liberty.
Noting that the revolutionary debates had an imperial context, Craig Yirush stated that
historians “failed to explore the ways that the political ideas of the English settlers who
eventually created a republican revolution were shaped by the experience of living in an Atlantic
23
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world of jurisdictional plurality and contested sovereignty.” 27 He asserted that the colonists
applied these English and European ideas in specific contexts. Therefore, “out of the crucible of
an Atlantic empire,” powerful ideas of rights and equality emerged.28 The political ideas of the
Loyalists showed us the other side of imperial debates. Their claims of liberty reminded us that
under the context of the turbulent imperial crisis, the debate of rights was still an ongoing
process.
2.2 Factions in New York
This paper also views New York Loyalists as a faction in colonial and revolutionary New
York. The decisive factors that affected the forming of factions included economic interests,
political positions, and different visions about the future of the colony. By the late colonial
period, factions had not developed into an organized party system, and therefore, although we
may call them “party” in a broader sense, the term “faction” will serve our purpose here to
elucidate the origins and functions of the factions in colonial and revolutionary New York. The
Loyalist camp which Samuel Seabury was a part of also evolved under this specific political
context.
Factions and divisions were the essential elements of colonial political argument, and New
York province was no exception. The fundamental work of party politics in colonial New York
is Carl Becker’s The history of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776. First
published in 1909, Becker’s monograph set up an important foundation on the studies of party
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politics in the colonial New York. Becker stated that before 1765 the political history of New
York was a contest between the governors and the assembly, each representing “different
interests and opposing principles.” The only thing that was permanent about factions was that
those who were attached to the governor’s interest were on one side and those who were opposed
to him used the assembly to thwart him. As the conflict with Britain gathered momentum, extralegal committees came to supersede the authority of the assembly. “The establishment of this
extra-legal machinery was the open door through which the common freeholder and the
unfranchised mechanic and artisan pushed their way into the political arena” to the dismay of the
land-owning and merchant aristocracy.29 In the end of chapter one, he asserted that,
From 1765 to 1776, therefore, two questions, about equally prominent, determined party
history. The first was whether essential colonial rights should be maintained; the second was
by whom and by what methods they should be maintained. The first was the question of
home rule; the second was the question, if we may so put it, of who should rule at home.30

The two questions he raised became targets for later scholarly discussions. Patricia Bonomi,
Alfred Young, Marc Egnal, and Michael Kammen all responded to Becker’s statement.31
Patricia Bonomi pointed out two problems with Becker’s assertion. First of all, she questioned
Becker’s usage of the term “Aristocracy.” She doubted that the aristocracy described by Becker
did exist in New York. One of her reasons was that the abundance of land made it difficult for
the planters to find tenants. Some people might question that if it was so difficult to find tenants,
how did the landlords keep prospering? Her answer was that “most of them did not; the majority
were gradually parceled out among various family members, or broken down into smaller farms
29
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and sold outright.”32 Through deeper research on the composition of the members of the New
York Assembly from 1750–1775, she found that “the assemblymen were approximately onethird patrician, one-third substantial middle-class, and one-third moderate middle-class.”33 She
also questioned Becker’s assertion that the aristocracy, which connoted stability, tranquility, and
order, controlled politics. Yet, she argued that New York’s early history was filled with political
strife.34 Therefore, there was no way for “aristocracy” or any other sect to control the politics in
New York.
Alfred Young argued that New York provincial politics was not characterized by a two-way
conflict, as Becker had previously noted, “but a three-way conflict,” including the conflict
between the Whigs and the Loyalists, within the Whigs’ camp, and between the tenants and
landlords. 35 Therefore, Loyalists, as the counterpart of the revolutionaries, developed into a
complex and diverse group of people at the eve of the American Revolution and played a crucial
role in colonial political history. According to Young, the many conservative Whigs, who later
became loyalists deserve further study.
Marc Egnal questioned Becker’s assumption that colonial factions were short-lived, lacked
coherence, and were held together by a simple desire for office rather than by any more profound
interest or world view. He argued that factions in Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts
were actually “long-lived and coherent,” and the factions emerging in each colony by 1740

32

Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1971), 6.
33
Bonomi, Factious People, 9n10.
34
Bonomi, Factious People, 10.
35
Young, Democratic Republicans, 11.

12

“underlay the choice of loyalties in the Revolutionary crisis.” 36 Egnal argued that as the
Revolutionary movement began, long-held views of empire were at the center of partisan
conflicts in New York. By 1769 the economic downturn had eased, and the Livingstons and
DeLanceys had become Patriots and Tories respectively. The choice of allegiances reflected a
pattern that had been evident even before the 1740s. 37 In his opinion, the different camps with
diverse opinions about the British Empire lasted and developed into Patriots and Tories.
Edward Countryman also challenged Becker’s idea of aristocratic domination in the
American Revolution. He claimed that most of his study, A People in Revolution: The American
Revolution and Political Society in New York, 1760–1790, was concerned with relations between
ordinary people and their rulers at the level of first, the provincial and later the state government.
He reminded his readers, “Local government was a significant factor in eighteenth-century New
York, sometimes socializing people into the ways of a participatory society and sometimes
repressing just such participation.” He thought that the charters of Albany and New York City
provided for popular involvement. “For though the governor appointed their mayors, their
freeholders and freemen elected their boards of aldermen and common councils.” Therefore, he
asserted that political power was close to people's daily lives. Ordinary men stood an excellent
chance of wielding their political power in a day-to-day manner.38
Countryman indicated that Carl Becker’s conclusion about the Revolution becoming a
struggle in these years over “who should rule at home” only began to suggest the complexity of
what was happening. No one knew in 1765 or even 1770 what would happen, but people did get
Marc Egnal, “The Pattern of Factional Development in Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts, 1682–1776”
in Party and Political Opposition in Revolutionary America, ed. Patricia U. Bonomi (New York: The Sleepy Hollow
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37
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used to “deliberately resisting authority, to challenging official policy, and to trying to change
social practice.”39
Countryman also pointed out that people integrated their concern about many other things
with their response to the imperial issue. Many people were so concerned about their own
difficulties that they neglected the imperial issue until the crisis of independence. That does not
mean they were irrelevant to the Revolution. Countryman insisted that, “their concern with
domestic issues had a major part in causing the crisis to strike at the whole system of colonial life
and not simply at the tie to Britain.”40 Domestic issues and imperial issues were inseparable, and
when it comes to discuss the politics in colonial New York, Countryman argued we have to
examine those two factors together. He commented on the situation in colonial New York:
People's anger expressed itself in many types of crowd action. There were crowds of mixed
social composition whose concern was primarily with the imperial issue. There were lowerclass urban crowds that had domestic problems in mind. There were other crowds of lowerclass city people who were learning to think independently about what the tie to Britain
meant in their lives. In the countryside men rioted in protest against a set of economic, social,
and political relations with which they could make no quarter.41

Even the riots, or crowd actions, contained plenty of different factors: different places, with
different people, with different motives. Countryman believed that “the net effect of all three
factors – social development, popular militance, and political decay—was to put New Yorkers in
a situation of readiness for a thoroughgoing revolution by 1773 or 1774.”42
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Countryman asserted that, for people in New York, “social and economic questions might
easily meld with political ones.” For example, “an artisan faced with depression could blame it
on the Stamp Act. He could demand that New York's port be opened in defiance of the act in the
hope of stimulating exports and that New Yorkers themselves consume the products of local
industry.” Moreover, “a laborer could grow irate when off-duty troops and naval sailors took
scarce work from him.” In the anger of such men, Countryman stated, was “the making of the
city's revolutionary coalition.” The imperial problems that the British imposed on the city after
1763 struck a place whose people had reason for quarreling among themselves. However, their
quarrels became intimately bound up with the way that they responded to what the British did.43
Consequently, Countryman believed that independence eventually changed New York and cut
their ties with Britain.
Michael Kammen noted that many of the Whig leaders in colonial New York had been
trained in the law, an education that heightened their appreciation of constitutional grievances
but also made them hesitant to take part in extralegal activities. In consequence the leaders were
pulled along by public opinion and by the irresistible force of the people. Most of the major
trends and themes in New York's colonial history played important roles in determining the
province's revolutionary experience. An excess of pluralism and materialism combined with a
lack of coherent community to make rebellion in New York a fairly distinctive phenomenon.
But what made New York’s rebellion so problematic, Kammen declared, was that “it paralleled
the troubles arising from Forsey v. Cunningham (1763–65), the Sugar Act crisis (1764), and the
Stamp Act (1765).” “Similarly, the Stamp Act crisis (1765–1766) overlapped the passionate
protest aroused in New York by enforcement of the Quartering Act (1765–1767), a dispute that
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led in turn to Parliament's passage in 1767 of the Restraining Act. That, in turn, coincided with
the furor over the Townshend duties, and so it went.”44
These studies show that New York Loyalists lived in a factious society. Ordinary people and
elites competed in leading the revolutionary movement. Samuel Seabury, representing Anglican
power and ideology, played a supportive role in the Loyalist camp. Kammen mentioned that
people’s attitude towards local issues helped formed their decisions on imperial issues. Seabury’s
attitude towards the issue of appointing an American bishop also informed his decision on
occupying the Loyalist side.
2.3 Loyalists
The study of Loyalists showed another perspective toward the American Revolution. The
Loyalists were of diverse origins: Anglican preachers and the non-clerical Loyalists, or as
Benton called, the Whig-Loyalists. Since the Loyalists came from diverse interests, backgrounds
and social status, they were likely to have diverse opinions. However, they at least held one thing
in common: their claims for liberty.
Robert M. Calhoon’s The Loyalists in Revolutionary America made a substantial contribution
to the studies of Loyalists. Calhoon used a chapter to state William Smith Jr.’s effort on
mediating between the Loyalists and Patriots. He also used several chapters to illustrate the
political ideas of Samuel Seabury and Myles Cooper, and another couple chapters to describe the
Loyalists in New York, both state and city. It is a very comprehensive monograph. 45 William H.
Nelson spent a chapter in his book illustrating the composition of the loyalist rank and file. He
Michael Kammen, Colonial New York: A History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 348–9.
Robert McCluer Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760–1781 (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1973). See also, Wallace Brown, The King’s Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American
Loyalist Claimants (Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1965).
44
45
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thought that it was dangerous to make class generalizations about the Revolution. For example,
he pointed out that “when an Act of Banishment was passed against some three hundred
Loyalists in Massachusetts in 1778, they were listed by trade or profession.” The ranks of the
banished were comprised as follows: “a third were merchants, professional men, and gentlemen;
another third were farmers, and the rest were artisans or labourers with a sprinkling of small
shopkeepers.”46 William Benton in his Whig-Loyalism asserted that not all the Loyalists were
Tories. Actually, some people were originally Whigs, and later become Loyalists. They became
Loyalists because they disagreed with the methods that the radicals used, and many of them went
back to the United States after the revolution.47
Recently, Brendan McConville emphasized royalism in pre-revolutionary period. He
reminded us that
In the royal America that existed between the Glorious Revolution and 1776, that which we
call political culture, the milieu in which politics takes place, was decidedly monarchical and
imperial, Protestant and virulently anti-Catholic, almost to the moment of American
independence.

He also argued, “Writers who lived in this society internalized and reinforced its values. Almost
everything printed between 1689 and 1775 expressed an intense admiration for the monarchy.”48
In his research he depicted the process of Anglicization in colonial society, and concluded that
the fall of royal America defined the period around the Independence. Though the revolutionary
culture was greatly influenced by the political ideas of Enlightenment, McConville asserted that
the culture in colonial America was very royalist in reality. The idea of Neoabsolutism
46
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reemerged in colonial culture, and the claims of kings’ divine right were popular.

Americans

adapted the language of divine rights to describe the Hanoverian kings, and equated loyalty to
the kings with loyalty to God.49 He concluded that when scholars came to understand the royal
nature of the provincial past, scholars will be able to change their understanding of what
followed. Many colonial behaviors revealed a “desperate need for ties to the past,” 50 which
demonstrated how royalist the Americans were.
In addition, Loyalism in New York was an important issue, and therefore, some books
focused on this theme. Philip Ranlet’s The New York Loyalists provided a comprehensive
political and social history of the Loyalists in New York. Although it did not mention much
about intellectual history, Ranlet discerned that:
Since New York seemed divided, puzzled observers in other colonies probably assumed that
the division amounted to a fight between Tories and Whigs, instead of what it really was—a
debate about the method of opposition to the British.51

Ranlet noted that one of the special characteristics of the conflicts between Patriots and Loyalists
in New York was that it did not lead to a physical violence, but led to published debates. Many
scholars asserted that a group of people categorized as “Whig-Loyalists” among the Loyalists
supported the Congress in the beginning, but eventually adopted the loyalist position.52 In Loyal
Whigs and Revolutionaries, Leopold S. Launitz-Schürer, Jr. depicted the development of the
Patriot and Loyalist factions in New York. This book reexamined the rivalry of the Livingston
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and De Lancey families to evaluate the way the rivalry shaped politics and the growth of a
revolutionary ideology and also the struggle for power between the elites. 53 Although being
viewed as a staunch Loyalist family, Launitz-Schürer pointed out that the DeLanceys did not
accept the classic conservatism that William Nelson suggested marked the American Tory. Their
belief and actions, however, were identical to those of the revolutionaries, so Launitz-Schürer
also categorized them as the “whig-loyalists,” or as he named the title of his book, “Loyal
Whigs.”54
Maya Jasanoff and Ruma Chopra have both published recent books on Loyalism. Jasanoff’s
book, Liberty’s Exiles, focused on the exile of the Loyalists and their influence after the
Revolution.55 Liberty’s Exiles is an extension of her article in 2008. In her article, Maya Jasanoff
claimed that the Loyalists have long been relegated to the margins of mainstream history, and
have figured little in the major treatments of British politics and identity during the war. 56
However, Jasanoff asserted that the exile of the Loyalists from the thirteen colonies to the other
parts of the British Empire actually played a crucial role in Atlantic history and even in the
history of the worldwide British Empire. 57 She concluded that all aspects of these Loyalist
migrations offered insight into how Britain and their empire rebounded from the lost war, and
also showed the value of a global and comparative study of this topic. She believed that by
taking a global approach one can describe the transnational experiences of many Loyalist
refugees.58 In other words, the Loyalist migrants are an unusually valuable group through which
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to investigate imperial history in this decade of change. Out of her research, she suggested that
the historiography of the American Revolution and the British Empire needed revisiting in the
two following ways. “One concerns the global nature of the Revolution,” and the other involves
“the nature of the British imperial state.”59
On the other hand, Ruma Chopra said, in her introduction, that “the Americans who opposed
independence felt a deeper threat from rebel leaders who justified the legality of revolution than
from the restrictive legislation imposed by the British ministry.” She further stated that the
Loyalists:
[s]hared similar fears about the unleashing of violence that threatened to annihilate any sense
of reason, about the blindness and provincialism of rebel leaders who awoke the passion of
the mob on a utopian vision that had no successful historical precedent, and about the
appalling prospect of an unbalanced society.60

Chopra indicated that leading New Yorkers favored a moderate path between radicalism and
unquestioning obedience. They believed that arbitrary taxes violated their political liberties as
British subjects. Because they lived in a commercial city blessed by the benefits of British
Empire, leading New Yorkers avoided taking any action that would jeopardize their ties to the
empire.61 In conclusion, Chopra thought that the Loyalists confronted a realization that “they
valued the symbols of the British Empire” “more deeply than the Crown’s representatives in
New York or in London.” They expected to be the partners of the British army but the British
government did not treat them as they expected.62
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Janice Potter’s The Liberty We Seek examined the Loyalist ideology, and is most close to the
theme of this research.63 It broadly discussed the Loyalist ideology, analyzed Loyalists’ fear for
democratic tyranny, and traced the colonial and British origins of Loyalist thought. Potter
claimed that the Loyalists’ plan was to restore the order, keep the imperial union intact, and
reform the colonial institution. Their alternative to the revolution was a reformed British Empire
and revitalized colonial institutions.64 By researching the political and religious debates centered
on the King’s College Controversy, Donald F. M. Gerardi deeply delved into the embryo of the
Whig-Tory argument. He asserted that the debates about the King’s College controversy later
developed into the Patriot-Loyalist debates on the eve of the Revolution. Therefore, through his
study on the King’s College controversy, he actually explained the ideology behind the Anglican
Loyalists.65 While Potter examined the Loyalist ideology in a broader sense, Gerardi focused on
the Anglican Loyalists and correctly pointed out their connection with the controversy two
decades ago.
These former studies provided necessary background knowledge for this research. Although
most of the scholars noted that the Anglican Church had some connection with Loyalism, the
study of this connection is still absent. Moreover, although there were many Anglicans who
joined the Loyalist camp, there were still many others who chose the other side—for example,
John Jay and Alexander Hamilton. By further studying the political and religious thoughts of
Samuel Seabury, we could not only delve into the intellectual world of a significant Anglican
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figure, but also open a door to an advanced understanding of the connection between Loyalism
and Anglicanism.
3. Samuel Seabury in the American Revolution
3.1 The Loyalists in New York
The steps that the First Continental Congress took stimulated the opposing people to form a
loyalist faction. Thomas Jones explained that many Loyalists supported the Congress because
they expected the Congress to come up with a method to reconcile with the mother country;
however, what the Congress produced at last was “a declaration of war.”66 According to Joseph
S. Tiedemann’s research, the Loyalists in New York “came from all walks of life but were most
prominent among crown officials, patricians, De Lanceyites, Anglicans, merchants, ideologues,
and recent English immigrants.” They disagreed among themselves and with Britain over the
right of taxation, the issue of Tea Act, and the Coercive Acts; however, they all agreed that
British America was moving toward independence. John Alsop resigned as a member in the
Provincial Congress after the declaration of independence. He stated, “As long as a door was left
open for a reconciliation … I was willing and ready to render my country all the service in my
power, and for which purpose I was appointed and sent to this Congress; but as you have … by
that Declaration, closed the door of reconciliation. I must beg leave to resign my seat.” 67 Alsop’s
statement demonstrated one of the typical characteristics of the political positions of the New
York Loyalists: They believed that the Parliament made mistakes, but they insisted that this
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mistake should be made up by negotiation and reconciliation, not by an abrupt break with the
mother country.
Since the Loyalists came from “all walks of life” as Tiedemann stated, they were a complex
composition. Socially, the DeLanceyite merchants were concerned about their economic links
with the empire, and some residents sided with the king because of their adherence to elitist rule;
others loyally emulated the example of the political leaders they had followed for years. Some
Livingstonites, though, while opposed to the Delanceyites for many years, chose to become
Loyalists because they preferred royal tyranny to mobocracy. Intellectually, many Loyalists were
the heirs of Bolingbroke, Montesquieu, Edmund Burke, and William Blackstone. They were
conservatives who abhorred “the whig preference for equality, individualism, and limited
government.” Some New York Loyalists were persuaded by constitutional arguments supporting
the Parliamentary supremacy. 68
The Loyalists were also religiously diverse. For Anglicans like Samuel Seabury, Myles
Cooper, Thomas Bradbury Chandler, and Charles Inglis, their loyalism revealed their church’s
theology and history. Tiedemann pointed out that they believed in a hierarchical society,
mistrusted ordinary people, and were convinced that faith required “obedience to God, king,
lords and bishops.” Of course, Anglicans were not the only Loyalists; some members of the
Dutch Reformed church were also Loyalists. Most American Methodists became Loyalists or
remained neutral. Quakers were pacifists who rejected the notion of bearing arms and strove to
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stay neutral.69 Though their reasons and ideas were diverse, everyone had his own reason to be
loyal to the king.
In his research on Frederick Philipse III, Jacob Judd suggested that “political ideology, party
factionalism, and church affiliation” were some of the important factors which helped the
Loyalists determine their choices. On the other hand, allegiances related to social and political
position also helped form their ultimate decision.70 Tiedemann called the New Yorkers “reluctant
revolutionaries” for a reason. Judd pointed out that most New Yorkers “agreed the concept that
Crown had erred, but they also adhered to the idea that they must recognize the Crown's
authority.” People wavered on their stances. It would be very difficult to predict if one would
become a Patriot or Loyalist according to one’s stance in 1765, since leading New Yorkers
actually favored a moderate path between the radical Liberty Boys and the absolute royalists.
Eventually, events outside the province, such as the Declaration of Independence, compelled the
New Yorkers to reach final decisions. In fact, Judd noted, New York did not ratify the
Declaration until July 9, at a point when “it realized that it had to join her sister states in the
ensuing struggle or stand against them alone.”71
In the process of wavering between two camps, many prominent American Whigs ended up
refusing independence. William Benton called them “Whig-Loyalists,” and Leopold S. LaunitzSchürer, Jr. named them “Loyal Whigs.” Peter Van Schaack was one of the most scrupulous
among them. His hopes rested on a belief that Congress would reject the use of armed force. He
did not champion the “violent measures” of his neighbors, but would support the Continental
Association since “[i]t is a peaceable mode of obtaining redress.” He tended to go along with the
69
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Congress to a certain extent, hoping to fortify what they conceived to be the rights of their
country. However, as soon as he found that the designs of the American leaders were to dissolve
the union between Great Britain and the colonies, he refused to participate in the process.72 As a
lawyer, he remained loyal due to his legal understanding of the binding contract between the
empire and the colonies.73 This attitude was a common one among many Loyalists in New York.
Another important example of the New York Loyalists is the DeLancey family. Through the
DeLanceys-Linvingstons rivalry, the DeLanceys grasped the main prominent political positions
in colonial New York. Launitz-Schürer pointed out that the DeLanceys did not accept the classic
conservatism that William Nelson has suggested marked the American Tory. Their belief and
actions, however, were nearly identical to those of the revolutionaries, so Launitz-Schürer also
categorized them as “whig-loyalists.”74
Those Whig-Loyalists were the political leaders of the Loyalists in New York; however, the
writers who participated in the pamphlet war were Anglican clergyman. Led by Samuel Seabury,
Charles Inglis, and Thomas Bradbury Chandler, the Anglican clergy in New York and New
Jersey attacked the Continental Association during the fall of 1774. 75 Unlike the Anglican clergy
and Whig-Loyalists, many New Yorkers did not leave behind specific ideological reasons for
their decision during the rebellion.76 Therefore, the writings of the Whig-Loyalists and Anglicans
became the most important materials for historians to understand the political ideas of the
Loyalists.
3.2 Samuel Seabury and the Church of England
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Samuel Seabury was born in Groton, Connecticut on November 30, 1729. His parents had just
converted from Congregationalism to the Church of England when he was born. He studied at
Yale for several years, and after he got a degree at Yale, went to Edinburgh, Scotland to study
anatomy and physics in 1752. He was ordained a deacon and priest and then appointed to New
Brunswick. He returned to America in 1754 and then was promoted to Jamaica, Long Island in
1757.77 Being an Anglican preacher, Seabury’s sermons and pamphlets were based on a set of
governmental ideas that could be linked to his Anglican belief.
The established church in New England in the colonial era was the Congregational order.
However, in June 1722, Timothy Cutler, a rector of Yale College, as well as four other tutors
declared that they would give up their Congregational posts and seek ordination in the Church of
England. This development partly resulted from a donation of about one thousand volumes to the
library of Yale by Jeremiah Dummer, Connecticut’s colonial agent in London. This collection
included many books by Anglican divines, which influenced the readers in the college at that
time. By 1765, among the 400 ministers graduated from Yale, 10 percent of them became
Anglican clergy.78 Seabury and his father were both influenced by this trend. Seabury’s father,
Samuel Seabury Sr., married around 1726 and was brought in association with members of the
Church of England. Seabury Sr.’s father-in-law, Thomas Mumford, was the uncle by marriage of
Dr. McSparran, the celebrated missionary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
(S.P.G.) in that region. The religious tendency of Old Seabury’s wife’s family, and the public
agitation of the subject, led Old Seabury to research Episcopal claims. Eventually, he ceased to
officiate for the Congregationalists in North Groton, and declared his intention of crossing the
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ocean to obtain Holy Orders in the spring of 1730.79 Though Samuel Seabury was baptized by a
Congregational minister in 1729, he grew up in the Anglican Church.
Historically, the emergence of the Church of England paralleled the development of nationstates. One major difference that the Church of England held was that the leader of the Anglican
Church was not the Pope, but the King of England. The purpose of this change was to avoid
Rome’s foreign influence on the politics of England. Simultaneously, this change also marked
their desire to make themselves a distinct group of people, and thus formulated the idea of the
nation. Therefore, the idea of a united nation and of the supreme authority of the King and
Parliament rooted deeply into Anglican concept of liberty began to congeal.
One of the problems restricting the development of the Anglican Church in America was that
the church could not provide sufficient clergymen to the colonies. Without a resident bishop in
America, prospective Anglican clergy had to voyage across the Atlantic Ocean to England to
accept the ordination, which was costly, time consuming, and dangerous. Therefore, American
Anglicans had been petitioning the Anglican Church for a resident bishop in America for many
years and aroused a great deal of opposition, not only from Congregationalists and Presbyterians,
but also from other Anglicans who were “convinced that their own hard-won traditions of
government in church and state were threatened by the growth and spread of episcopacy.” 80 The
opposition of some Anglicans to this effort to install bishops could also explain the reason that
some Anglicans, such as John Jay and Alexander Hamilton eventually chose to stand with the
revolutionaries.
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For the opponents of American bishops, everything the English and American clerical
Episcopal advocates and their allies among the laity did “seemed to militate towards a greater
degree of imperial control over the colonies,” and also, their “incarnational understanding of the
church’s mission and the establishment tradition of the Church of England alike made them
acutely conscious of the political dimension of religious issues.”81 The Dissenters wondered if
Anglican advocates were “sincere in their desire for a purely ‘spiritual’ episcopate, or did they
regard that goal as a stalking horse for a more fully developed establishment and ecclesiastical
supremacy over the Dissenters?” The Dissenters distrusted the Anglicans’ intention, believing
that the Anglicans were involved in “some underhanded plot against American liberties,” and
adhered to “an older religio-political system whose values would continue to be upheld in the
British Empire.” 82 Therefore, the controversy of the American bishop issue was not only a
problem of religion, but also of politics, especially imperial politics.
The Anglican clergy argued that God’s incarnation in Jesus Christ instilled his Spirit into the
material world and enabled humans to receive God’s grace through material things in the
church’s sacraments. They also stated that it was the church’s responsibility to sanctify the
community. Therefore, “the natural tendency for those schooled in such a theology would be to
understand church and state as a natural whole and to seek the reconciliation and unity of the
two.”83 For the Anglican clergy, the Church and the British nation were inseparable. 84 Samuel
Seabury’s sermon demonstrated the implication of this unified concept of politics and religion.
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In a sermon Seabury published in 1777, he emphasized the idea that people should fear God,
and honor the King, showing his belief in the divine origin of Kingship. He believed that the
writings of the Apostles contained rules and directions on all the different relations of men in this
world, and therefore:
As the grand relative Duty, so far as civil society is concerned, is that which all Men owe to
the Government under which God’s Providence hath place them, the Apostle first attends to,
and inculcates upon Christians, due and peaceable Submission to that Authority under which
they live; whether it be exercised by Kings as Supreme, or by Governors sent by them, and
acting by their authority.85

He asserted that God’s Providence had placed men under the supremacy of Kings, and accused
the revolutionaries of “pretending that their Christian Liberty set them free from their Subjection
to civil Government.”86 For Seabury, civil government “was the Order and Institution of God
himself,” and thus people actually disobeyed God when they disobeyed legal government. 87
Seabury further elucidated that without Society, man “could not subsist with Safety and Comfort
to himself,” and also “without Government there can be no Society, at least no Security in
Society: And without Governors and Rulers, there can be no Government.” Therefore, he
asserted, “reason and common sense will teach us to honor and esteem those from whom we
receive[d] protection.”88
The revolutionaries contended that the measures of British Parliament encroached upon their
rights as Britons, and believed in the British government’s inherent corruption. However,
Seabury doubted men’s judgmental abilities. He reflected: “Are we always competent Judges of
85
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the good or evil Conduct of those whom God's Providence hath placed over us?” He reminded
his audience that “our Passions and Prejudices often mislead us in the Judgment.” The current
revolt, he opined, would “dissolve all the Ties of Government, and introduce Anarchy, and
Oppression, and Confusion, because some of the Officers of Government had behaved amiss.”89
He pointed out that when Peter commanded the Church to fear God and honor the King, they
were ruled by kings like Nero and Caligula.90 He implied that the Apostles asked the Church to
obey kings even as such, so they absolutely needed to obey their current king. He adopted Peter’s
exhortation for people to fear God, and said, “The Fear of God, therefore, binds all the Duties
which we owe to civil Government,”91 and therefore, he further instructed:
In the Empire to which we belong, the supreme Authority is vested in the King, the Lords and
the Commons of the Realm, conjunctly called the Parliament; and to the Laws of this supreme
Authority absolute Submission and Obedience are due, both upon the Principles of Religion,
and of good Policy.92

He affirmed that the supreme authority of civil government, which fell on the King, the Lords,
and the Commons, required absolute obedience and submission. He rebuked the revolutionaries
for “breaking through all the Bonds of civil Society, effacing the Principles of Morality from
among Men, treading under Foot the Dictates of Humanity and the Rights of their Fellow
Subjects, subverting the most mild and equitable System of Laws, introducing the most horrid
Oppression and Tyranny, and filling the Country with Confusion, Rapine, Destruction, Slaughter
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and Blood!” 93 Accordingly, he urged the Loyalists to restore “[p]eace, Order and good
Government again in this Country.”94
In another sermon Seabury preached in British-occupied New York in 1777, he emphasized
that the kingdom should not be divided. He presumed that human beings were “born for society,”
and that the aim of every society was “the peace, order and welfare of the human species.”95
However, malevolence and “impetuosity of passion” usually put the society in danger. To avoid
this danger, he asserted that “the laws of civil society, the laws of God, the tender, sociable and
humane feelings of the heart, all concur to restrain the inordinacy of passion, to bridle the lust of
revenge; and all these united, and assisted by education, are scarcely sufficient to answer the
purpose.”96 In other words, he believed that men had to be restrained by civil laws and divine
laws to do good. Seabury further said that, “To bring about this happy state by restraining the
malevolent tempers of our nature, and by cherishing those of a kind and benevolent tendency,
is the proper business of reason, the grand aim of religion, especially of that religion which the
son of God hath communicated to the world.” 97 As a clergyman, he attempted to balance
between reason and religion, and claimed that both of them aimed at the “happy state” of human
beings through the regulation of human nature. In this sermon, he quoted chapter 133 in Psalms
and explained King David’s feelings about brotherhood. He noted that David had “long viewed,
and lamented over his country torn to pieces with party and faction, and languishing under all the
horrors and distresses of civil war.” He compared the fights between Loyalists and Patriots to the
contest between Saul and David. Seabury was not willing to see the country torn apart by the
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conflicts between the colonies and her parent country. He hoped that “His foreign enemies were
subdued or humbled, his own people were united and happy.” Just as what happened in Ancient
Israel, he wanted the rebellion to be crushed, and to see that “the hedious [hideous] monster”
were punished so that “peace, order and happiness were restored.”98
Seabury preached both sermons in British-occupied New York. The audience of those
sermons originally was mainly the Anglican Loyalists who stayed in, or flowed into, New York
as the Revolutionary War started. Therefore, they demonstrated the purest form of Anglican
view on the imperial politics by emphasizing the value of divine Kingship, peace and order, and
connected these values with faith and happiness, which constituted the core of Seabury’s
arguments, not only on religion, but even extending to politics. On the other hand, they were not
only preached, but also published as propaganda of the Anglican Church and the Loyalist cause.
As Doll has pointed out, the concern for both the sacred and secular was a “particularly Anglican
trait.”99 The dual role that these sermons and Anglican clergies played showed the premise of the
political discourse of the Anglican preachers, including Samuel Seabury.
3.4 Samuel Seabury on the Eve of the Revolution: His Ideas about Representation
Samuel Seabury was not only an Anglican Loyalist, but also a Loyalist in a broader sense. He
published a series of political pamphlets from 1774 to 1775 to rebuke the measures of the
Continental Congress, and his contemporaries regarded him as a supporter of the DeLanceys
because of the ideas revealed in his pamphlets. 100 The ideas in these pamphlets had their
beginnings in the very earliest days of his ministry, while he was still at New Brunswick. These
writings were at last published in the form of a series of pamphlets which he wrote under the
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signature of A. W. Farmer. These pamphlets were highly popular among those Loyalists and
excited a very bitter antipathy among the Patriots.101 The Sons of Liberty seized him in 1775, and
accused him of writing pamphlets “against the liberties of America.”102 Their animosity against
him showed the influence and importance of his pamphlets.
Seabury seldom used religious theology or terms in these political pamphlets directly. Rather,
he sounded completely like a political writer. He argued that the British Parliament, as the
supreme authority of the whole empire, could represent the American colonists, and therefore
had the right to regulate the whole empire, which certainly included the American colonies. He
said that “in every government there must be a supreme, absolute authority lodged somewhere.”
For the whole British Empire, “the supreme authority is vested in the King, Nobles and People,
i.e. the King, House of Lords, and House of Commons elected by the people. This supreme
authority extends as far as the British dominions extend.” 103 Therefore, when the Patriots
doubted whether the authority of British Parliament could reach the American colonies, they
actually declared they were not part of the British Empire. Samuel Seabury attacked this
assertion by explaining the principle of representation:
It is the happiness of the British Government, and of all the British Colonies, that the people
have a right to share in the legislature. This right they exercise by choosing representatives;
and thereby constituting one branch of the legislative authority. But when they have chosen
their representatives, that right, which was before diffused through the whole people, centers
in their Representatives alone; and can legally be exercised by none but them.

He viewed the assemblies in the colonies as “one branch of the legislative authority,” and
therefore represented the proper authority in the colonies. Since they had already elected their
101

William Jones Seabury, Memoir of Bishop Seabury (New York: Edwin S. Gorham, 1908), 132.
Chopra, Unnatural Rebellion, 42.
103
Samuel Seabury, A View of the Controversy between Great-Britain and Her Colonies (New York, 1774), 9.
102

33

representatives for the assemblies, they should not and could not elect another group of
representatives to execute the legislature’s authority. Seabury asserted that these representatives
thus became “the guardians of the lives, the liberties, the rights and properties, of the people.” So
the people should “treat them with honor and respect,” and ask them to help the people that went
through the difficulties that people were facing.104
Even though he emphasized that the proper representatives were the delegates in colonial
assemblies, he actually condemned the Continental Congress as illegal. Seabury attacked the
Congress in many aspects. First, he claimed that “the assemblies have but a delegated authority
themselves,” so they could not “delegate that authority to three or four persons.” The colonial
assemblies have “betrayed the rights and privileges of the people whom they represented” in this
manner. They were exercising a power which they never “received from the people.” 105 When
the colonies elected their delegates to the Continental Congress, they ignored the colonial
assemblies in this process. Seabury noted that the representatives in the assemblies did not ignore
people’s interests; however, the people neglected these assemblies. He viewed the
revolutionaries’ action of forming a new Continental Congress as unlawful. He emphasized that
“the assembly are a body known and acknowledged by the law of the empire.”106
Since the colonists felt that their rights were neglected, they should petition through an
acknowledged and lawful procedure. He further stated:
You know in your conscience that they [the delegates in the Continental Congress] were not
chosen by a hundredth part of the people. You know also, that their appointment was in a way
unsupported by any law, usage, or custom of the province. You know also, that the people of
this province had already delegated their power to the members of their Assembly, and
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therefore had no right to choose Delegates, to contravene the authority of the Assembly, by
introducing a foreign power of legislation.107

Except for the legitimate status of the Congress, Seabury pointed out another problem of the
Congress here: whom did the Congress represent? He mentioned that the delegates “were not
chosen by a hundredth part of the people.” In other words, the people who would vote to send
delegates to an unlawful institution were those who were affiliated with a specific faction. The
number of the people who were willing to break the law was very limited. Those people who
were unwilling or at least hesitating to support an illegal organization would not vote. Therefore,
when the Congress made agreements and forced all colonists to conform to those agreements,
they actually made decisions without most people’s consents. Throughout the pamphlets that he
published during the revolutionary era, he unceasingly rebuked the people who disregarded what
he considered to be their true representatives, and attacked the Congress and the committees
around the colonies for usurping legislative authority and power from the colonial assemblies.
Accordingly, Seabury condemned:
A committee, chosen in a tumultuous, illegal manner, usurped the most depotic authority over
the province. They entered into contracts, compacts, combinations, treaties of alliance, with
the other colonies, without any power from the legislature of the province. They agreed with
the other Colonies to send Delegates to meet in convention at Philadelphia, to determine upon
the rights and liberties of the good people of this province, unsupported by any Law.108

Seabury emphasized that all the committees were “without any power from the legislature of the
province,” and “unsupported by any law.” The Congress and the committees operated under its
direction were not only illegal, but also not protecting people’s liberty. Seabury’s stance on the
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Continental Congress was distinct from the Whig-Loyalists’. The Whig-Loyalists were
supporters of the Continental Congress until the eve of the Revolution.
Seabury’s argument about representation touched two crucial questions: Did British
Parliament have the right to regulate the American colonies without Americans’ consent? And
was the Continental Congress a lawful representative institution? Since it was impossible for
each person to participate in the public affair, the function of parliament as the representative
was crucial. If the parliament failed to function as a representative of the people, then people
would lose all their claims of rights. Therefore, what was an appropriate representation became
the core of the argument. We should notice that the franchise in the eighteenth century was not as
extensive as it is nowadays. Rozbicki reminded his readers that “early modern liberty was a
social relation between unequals.”109 The franchise was a very limited privilege and was only
enjoyed by a small group of people with property. However, the problem here was that the
Americans, even if they were freemen with property, had no representative in British Parliament.
While the Patriots claimed that they were not properly represented by the British
Parliament,110 Seabury asserted that the British Parliament, as the supreme power in the whole
empire, did rightfully represent the colonies. This was an awkward argument. If the Patriots were
right, then as Seabury said, the empire would have to be completely torn apart. However, if
Seabury was right, then the British people could do whatever they wanted and ignore the
opinions of the colonies. Edmund Burke, as a leading speaker and writer of the Rockingham
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Whigs, supported the American claims in Parliament, and even proposed to allow American
colonies their independence to end the costly war. When Edmund Burke spoke to sustain the
American colonies in Parliament, he faced the same dilemma Seabury did. By comparing
Seabury and Burke’s viewpoints on the authority of the British Parliament, Seabury’s argument
seemed to be more conservative than his British Whig contemporaries, and represented a more
stern British perspective. In order to support American claims, Burke insisted some
constitutional principles and at the same time provided some conditions for Americans to argue
for a compromise. He said:
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which
interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates;
but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole-where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting
from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed; but when you have
chosen him, he is not member of Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament.111

He emphasized that the members of Parliament had to not only consider the interest of the area
they were elected from, but the common interest of the whole empire. This was the spirit of
virtual representation.
However, in reality, members of Parliament would consider others’ interests with difficulty.
When it came to the American colonies, Burke believed that the power of virtual representation
could not cross the Atlantic Ocean.112 He warned his colleagues “that great caution ought to be
used in the exercise of all our legislative rights over an object so remote from our eye, and so
little connected with our immediate feelings.” He also argued that the distance made it
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impractical for the American colonies to elect their members of Parliament from American
colonies and send them to London. 113 He did not really make any novel argument about
representation to solve the dilemma. However, he suggested that the Parliament should be very
cautious in exercising its supreme authority to rule such a distant place. In other words, the
Parliament had the right to tax the colonies, but they should be prudent in doing so. This idea of
Parliamentary authority was not fundamentally different from Seabury’s. Burke also insisted that
Parliamentary authority was supreme. Only that authority had to be exercised cautiously.
Although Burke did not refuse the idea of the American Revolution, his concept of
Parliamentary authority later developed into the commencement of the ideology of conservatism.
His concept of Parliamentary authority was a less absolute version of the Loyalist one, and the
reason to be less absolute was that his purpose to deliver those speeches was to support the
American claims, not to deny them, which is what Seabury always attempted to do.
For Seabury, the other question was about the lawfulness of the Continental Congress. While
many other Whig-Loyalists, such as the DeLanceys, John Alsop, and Peter Van Schaack,
admitted the lawful status of the Congress, Seabury not only rebuked the Congress’ decisions,
but also definitely rejected the legality of the Continental Congress, for it is not the institution
under the existent constitution. As his Anglican background demonstrated, he insisted that order
was a crucial element in civil society and liberty had to rest on the basis of stable civil society;
therefore, these sorts of unlawful measures would disturb the order as well as the true liberty of
people.
3.5 Samuel Seabury on the Eve of the Revolution: His Idea on Freedom
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When Seabury said that he expected the Congress to make plans for amending the colonies’
relationship with the Britain, it seemed that he would accept their agreement if Congress’
measures were acceptable. However, he severely attacked the Congress on its misbehavior. He
condemned the action of the Congress or the Congress itself as tyrannical several times in his
pamphlets. He claimed that he wanted to expose “the false, arbitrary, and tyrannical principles
upon which the Congress acted,” and he also warned people that they were giving up their liberty
to “an illegal, tyrannical Congress.” 114 If we want to know the exact meaning of the word
“tyranny” in eighteenth-century Atlantic world, we have to try to understand this word in its
context. Samuel Johnson defined tyranny as “absolute monarchy imperiously administered,”
“unresisted and cruel power,” and “cruel government; rigorous command.”

115

Seabury

condemned the Congress as tyrannical in this context. He argued that true liberty would not
invade the rights of people with different opinions. For example, the Congress established many
committees around the colonies to enforce their policies. Seabury rebuked the Congress for
establishing committees and courts that were built upon “the same principle with the papish
Inquisition,” because “no proofs, no evidences are called for. The committee may judge from
appearances if they please—for when it shall be made to appear to be a majority of any
committee that the Association is violated, they may proceed to punishment.” Those measures
were absolutely imperious. Therefore, he said: “You establish a court of Inquisition, to decide, in
the most arbitrary, tyrannical and unheard-of manner, upon the liberties and properties of your
fellow-subjects, over whom you have no just or legal power.”116
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Furthermore, he also accused the Congress of directing, encouraging, and abetting a mob.
Seabury also charged the committee of sixty of being tax-gatherers to collect money for the
Boston poor and of being spies and informers whom monitored people to ensure that their plan
was being executed. Thus the people in New York were in danger of “being deprived of many of
the comforts, and of some of the necessaries of life,” and also their “very mode of living is made
subject to their inspection.” 117
Seabury not only attacked the Congress for the way that they perceived their concept of
liberty, but also provided his own version of liberty. To do this, he emphasized the advantages of
the British Constitution.
I must think that liberty under a King, Lords and Commons is as good as liberty under a
republican Congress: And that slavery under a republican Congress is as bad, at least, as
slavery under a King, Lords and Commons: And upon the whole, that liberty under the
supreme authority and protection of Great-Britain, is infinitely preferable to slavery under an
American Congress.118

Since Seabury believed there must be a supreme authority in the government, he trusted this
authority to the King-in-Parliament, rather than to the Congress. He then made an explicit
statement about liberty:
I will own and acknowledge that not only Americans, but Africans, Europeans, Asiaticks, all
men, of all countries and degrees, of all sizes and complexions, have a right to as much
freedom as is consistent with the security of civil society.119

The key point for his concept of liberty was that liberty should be “consistent with the security of
civil society.” Therefore, he asserted that “violent and illegal measures, even in the most
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necessary struggles for liberty, can never be justified, till all legal and moderate ones have
failed.”120 He believed that liberty could only endure in a society with stability and order, and
hence he asserted that the traditional balanced constitution of the British Empire was the best
political system for people to enjoy liberty.
Many Patriots presumed that the British government and the Anglican Church had a plan to
enslave America, and the acts of Parliament that the colonists complained of were the methods
by which they executed this evil plan. In a letter to the secretary of the Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel, Seabury ridiculed this idea and said that “the charge against the
clergy is a very extraordinary one—that they have, in conjunction with the Society and the
British ministry, laid a plan for enslaving America. I do not believe that those people who raised
this calumny believe one syllable of it.”121 In his pamphlet, Seabury reminded his readers that
this presumption had never been proved, and people should not rebel because of an imagined
conspiracy. In addition, he also argued:
If greater security to our rights and liberties be necessary than the present form and
administration of the government can give us, let us endeavour to obtain it; but let our
endeavours be regulated by prudence and probability of success. In this attempt all good men
will join, both in England and America: All, who love their country, and with the prosperity of
the British Empire, will be glad to see it accomplished.122

He admitted and understood that they needed greater security of their liberty; however, he
insisted that the efforts should be made in prudence.
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While Seabury insisted that liberty had to be protected in a stable civil society, many Patriots
had different foci and emphasized the inviolability of liberty. For example, James Otis averred
that the administrators of civil government were originally “the whole people.” People could
bestow the right of administration on “whom they pleased,” and this devolution was fiduciary
“for the good of the whole.”123 He said:
That by the British constitution, this devolution is on the King, lords and commons,
supreme, sacred and uncontrollable legislative power not only in the realm but through
dominions; that by the abdication, the original compact was broken to pieces; that by
revolution it was renewed and more firmly established, and the rights and liberties of
subject in all parts of the dominions more fully explained and confirmed.124

the
the
the
the

He suggested that the British Constitution, if executed properly, could align perfectly with the
concept of the social contract. However, he also pointed out that through revolution the compact
could be “renewed and more firmly established.” He further praised this Constitution as “the
most free one, and by far, the best, now existing on earth.” Therefore, by this Constitution, all
people in this kingdom were free. And thus, “no part of His Majesty’s dominions can be taxed
without their consent,” and also “every part has a right to be represented in the supreme or
subordinate legislature.” Otis warned that “the refusal of this principle would seem to be a
contradiction in practice to the theory of the constitution.”125 Otis claimed that his argument was
based on the theory of the British Constitution, and that the right of the colonists as British
subjects was ignored and invaded.
Another example for the Patriot discourse of the inviolability of liberty is from Stephen
Hopkins, the governor of Rhode Island. He published a pamphlet The Rights of the Colonies
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Examined in 1765, which demonstrated typical resistance and confusion aroused by Britain’s
new colonial policy. He stated that “those who are governed at the will of another, or of others,
and whose property may be taken from them by taxes or otherwise without their own consent
and against their will, are in the miserable condition of slaves.”126 Since the colonies came from
a kingdom renowned for liberty, the people should be free, and should be partakers and sharers
in all the privileges and advantages of the British Constitution.127
Although Seabury, Otis, and Hopkins all agreed on the same liberty out of the tradition of the
British constitution, their arguments showed different foci. While Otis and Hopkins stressed that
the British government should not intrude into people’s liberty by forcing them paying tax
without their consent, Seabury, on the eve of the Revolution, maintained that true liberty had to
subsist in a civil society with order and peace.
4. Conclusion: Understanding Seabury’s Concept of Liberty in the Eighteenth-Century Context
Michal Jan Rozbicki claimed that liberty was a privilege in the eighteenth century for it was
confined to a specific group of people, and therefore, the history of early modern American
freedom was “a lengthy chronicle of diverse groups pounding at the gates and demanding
membership.”128 In Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, liberty had five definitions: first, “Freedom, as
opposed to slavery”; second, “Freedom, as opposed to necessity”; third, “Privilege; exemption;
immunity”; fourth, “Relaxation of restraint”; and fifth, “Leave; permission.”129 These definitions
demonstrated the diverse characterizations of liberty. Through the analysis above, we could
conclude that Seabury’s arguments about liberty covered several topics: the justification of the
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representatives, the supreme national authority, and the conditions of liberty. Throughout his
pamphlets, he accused the Patriots of planning to establish a commonwealth. So, what was the
problem with establishing a commonwealth? Why did Seabury view it as a dangerous scheme?
This discussion involved the theory of classical republicanism. Around the English Civil War,
the discussion of natural rights among the British writers came to a peak. According to Quentin
Skinner, those seventeenth century writers usually claimed that “all citizens have an equal right
to the lawful enjoyment of their lives, liberties, and estates.”130 Skinner also stated that they also
believed that a free nation was “a community in which the actions of the body politic are
determined by the will of the members as a whole.”131 The problem was how to determine those
actions by the will of the members as a whole? Thus there came the concept of parliament as the
representative body of the citizens as a whole. The Patriots attempted to enlarge the realm of the
people owning liberty and having the right to participate in politics. On the other hand, Seabury
was more conservative on topic of the distribution of the right of liberty.
Seabury’s concept of supreme authority was rooted deeply in the tradition of the Church of
England. The Anglican Church viewed the King of England as their leader, holding the supreme
authority of both the nation and the Church. The reverence toward the authority of the king was
the most obvious factor that decided one to be Loyalist or Patriot.
Despite all the presumption of representation and supreme authority mentioned above,
throughout his argument on liberty, Seabury attacked the Patriots according to his definition of
liberty. He defined liberty as something that could not be achieved by violence. Therefore, he
devoted a lot of space in his pamphlets to assaulting the mobs and riots. On the other hand, he
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also argued that the Congress interfered with people’s rights of property and liberty by forcing
them to obey their measures. Ruma Chopra summed up that Seabury believed that society should
be hierarchical and that ordinary people needed to be supervised by kings and bishops. By
contrast, Presbyterianism would lead to revolution.132 However, when Seabury emphasized order,
peace, and unity in the pursuit of liberty, his belief actually fit into the context of eighteenthcentury British ideology.
Seabury was satisfied with the liberty afforded to colonial subjects under the British
Constitution, and tended to maintain the status quo. The American Revolution did not occur
under the aegis of a clear social consensus. Rather, the Revolution occurred in an age with
diverse ideas of liberty. All sides advocated liberty as a common value; however, they had
diverse opinions on who should enjoy it. While the Patriots protected and enlarged their liberty
by rebelling, the Loyalists protected their ideal liberty by uniting with the British side.
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